Introduction
Within little more than a decade, the word globalization has gone from being a 'catch-all' term used in the economics media to capture the process of integration in world financial, product and service markets, to a term that is now used widely to describe the impact of increased international integration across a range of fields -from literature to sociology to technology. More recently the term has begun to acquire a pejorative dimension, as 'antiglobalization' has become the slogan of groups critical of what they see as the exploitation by large corporate interests in the developed world of smaller companies in lesser-developed economies. Indeed, this shift in the meaning of globalization has led some economists (for example, Rodrik (2000:177) ) to favour the term 'international economic integration' as being 'self evident to economists' and less loaded with value judgments. Were this trend to continue, one could see the word entirely disappear from use as quickly as it appeared, to be replaced with parallel expressions such as 'international social integration' and 'international cultural integration'. This would be a loss in terms of our language as these terms lack the breadth that 'globalization' evokes as well as its strong inter-and cross-disciplinary associations.
Clearly globalization is a phenomenon that is wider than a single discipline. The
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines globalization as "the act of globalizing", and identifies Webster's Dictionary in 1961 as its source of the use of the word. Webster in turn defines "globalize" as "to make worldwide in scope or application" -nothing specifically related to economics or indeed to any particular discipline. The OED's first reference to the written use of the term globalization (with the European 's' spelling) is in The Spectator in 1962 -just four decades ago. The strong economic association with the term in recent times seems to have arisen some 20 years later in the mid-1980s, in the context of increased integration in product and financial markets. 1 The attraction of 'globalization' as a new word may have stemmed from its potential to capture the increased scale and intensity of international, and in particular economic, relationships in the late 1980s, arising from the cumulative effect of declining trade and capital barriers, reduced transport costs, and rapid development in, and diffusion of, modern electronics-based technology. The word came into widespread use in economics at a time when it was unclear how different the world economy might become as the possibilities of international fragmentation of production extended (Arndt and Kierzkowski: 2001) . This extension is increasingly evident in the growth and scale of international trade in manufactured components. Globalization captured the sense that there was something more than incremental change taking place -that all countries would be affected to some degree by the scale of integration, that no activities within countries were immune to the process, and that it could help some countries to leap-frog development stages. terms of achieving factor price equalization, increasingly we see trade and FDI as complements, with the strong growth in intra-firm trade and global outsourcing. Global outsourcing would not have been possible without technology -thus the interconnection between trade and technology. In some instances labour migration has been seen as an alternative to FDI (for example, in Eastern/Western Europe and in the USA/Mexico relationships), and technology has now allowed production to be separated geographically from factor inputs, for example, when Indian software engineers contribute to software services in Europe and the USA without ever leaving India.
Attempts to gauge the extent and depth of globalization have typically relied upon data measuring international trade and investment flows, omitting other less readily quantifiable aspects of global integration. Better globalization indices are required if we are to capture what is a major difference in the way in which economies have become interconnected over the past two decades. Furthermore, if we are to take a broader view of globalization, we need indices that capture the extent to which other non-economic activities have become increasingly internationalized, as these feedback into the economic relationships. One recent 'Globalization Index' 2 tracks economic interconnectedness (economic integration and technology) as well as social and political interconnectedness (personal contacts and political engagement) across sixty-two advanced economies and key emerging markets. While it is easy to criticize the purity of such indices, one must appreciate attempts to measure such important global changes.
During the 1980s we also witnessed a marked increase in the intensity of Europeanization (regional integration within Europe), which has had the effect of redefining the implicit and indeed explicit parameters of economic integration in historic terms.
Beginning with the abolition of barriers to trade and factor flows and continuing with the harmonization of fiscal and competition policies, Europe has now created Union-wide institutions and, as of 2002, eleven countries now share a single currency. Throughout this process of Europeanization, economic integration has been used as the key vehicle to achieve more fundamental integration in Europe. For economists interested in the world economy, the trends towards increased Globalization and Europeanization have broadened the scope of academic enquiry, increased emphasis on the complexity of economic interdependency both within and between companies and countries, and led to a better understanding of the role that supra-national institutional frameworks can and must play in developing such interdependency.
Globalization from an economic perspective manifests itself in increased international trade, foreign direct investment flows and, to a lesser extent, international migration of labour. But the process of globalizing, even in economic terms, is much more complex than is evident in aggregate data at product or factor level, irrespective of how refined the data are.
Many authors have attempted to deal with this complexity by combining studies based on aggregate data (on trade, factor flows, relative prices and wages, etc.) with country or sector case studies or historical examples from specific markets or periods; see for example, Feenstra (1998) , Obstfeld (1998), and Williamson (1998) .
In the vast literature on globalization, there is great emphasis on the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the process. The perceived dominance of MNCs (many of which are headquartered in the US) in certain product and service markets and the extent of global mergers and acquisitions provide, perhaps, some of the main reasons why globalization has attracted its pejorative dimension. While it is certainly the case that a large proportion of world trade takes place through MNCs, access to broader markets has been very important for local companies, which we label LCs. 
European globalization
The growth in international trade in Europe over the past fifty years has been dominated by Feenstra: 1998) .
This increased openness is regarded as a direct product of the reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade within the EU, the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers under the GATT and more recently under the WTO agreements, the lowering of trade transportation costs per unit, the rise in the share of weightless products in consumption, and the growth in the EU market.
In 1973 the EEC admitted its first new entrants, Denmark, Ireland, and the UK.
Reflecting the patterns of the incumbents, the smaller two countries had significantly higher trade/GDP ratios than the UK in 1970. If we can interpret the 1970s and 1990s as the decades reflecting EEC market-entry and single-market effects respectively, Table 10 .1 suggests that all three countries, particularly Ireland, enjoyed a strong EEC-entry trade effect, whereas only
Ireland enjoyed a very strong single-market effect. The latter effect is primarily through the increased attractiveness of Ireland as a production base for manufacturing by non-EU MNCs, especially those from the USA; see Krugman (1997) , Barry (1999) and Görg and Ruane (1999) . But is such an interpretation justified? Sweden and Austria also saw significant increases in their trade ratios during the 1990s when they entered the EU (in strong contrast to Norway which remained outside the EU), but they also enjoyed very substantial increases in trade in the 1970s when they were not EEC members. In effect, Table 10 .1 shows that the 1970s is the only decade in which the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP increased for all countries listed.
Turning to look at some other major OECD countries, we note that the ratios for the US, Japan and Australia are all lower than those for the individual European countries. The US ratio has risen dramatically over the period, with most of this increase (from a low base) taking place in the 1970s. While the ratio for Australia has risen steadily over the period, the Japanese ratio is still below its 1970s level. However, in contrasting EU and non-EU countries it could be argued that these data provide evidence of Europeanization and not Globalization, in the sense that the increased trade is intra-EU and a direct impact of the trade diversion impact of creating an economic trade area in Europe.
How much of the trade in Table 10 .1 is extra-EU versus intra-EU? If we apply the average ratio of intra-EU trade to total-EU trade of approximately 60 per cent for small countries and 50 per cent for large countries (European Commission: 1996) , and make the assumption that only non-EU trade represents globalisation, it could be argued that Europe is not markedly different from the US in terms of its openness to global trade. This estimate is consistent with the results obtained for 1995, which indicate strongly that the EU-15 as an area at that time was no more globalized in trade terms than was the US (see European Commission: 1997/ Table 2 ).
TABLE 10. 2 near here
Paralleling the focus on merchandise trade in Table 10 .1, we examine foreign direct investment (FDI) in the merchandise goods sector in Table 10 .2. It shows the wide variation in the ratio of the average of inward and outward FDI to GDP in different EU countries for the period 1970-2000, and for six sub-periods within that time frame 5 . Again, with the exception of Japan, there has been a marked increase in FDI flows for all countries in the 1990s. As with the trade data, the ratios are generally higher in EU than in non-EU countries and, except for Japan, they have risen very steeply in the six-year period to 2000. These indicators mask quite different balances between countries as some have large volumes of inward-and little outward-FDI, while others have more even volumes flowing in both directions; for example, until the past decade, Ireland had virtually no outward FDI but had exceptionally high levels in inward FDI. If we again apply the ratios of extra-EU to total FDI inflows in the EU to the totals here, and treat only those extra-EU flows as evidence of globalization, we find that in the period since 1985, when this ratio began to decrease, the scale of FDI is not much greater for the larger countries in the EU, with the exception of the UK, than it is for the US (see European Commission: 1996/Chapter 4).
In summary, two of the main indicators used to indicate economic globalization show that while openness in trade and FDI has increased in Europe, much of the increase has involved Europeanization rather than Globalization. That is, trade and FDI flows by EU countries have been concentrated within Europe rather than flowing strongly into and out of the EU. For the remainder of this paper we concentrate on how, in the context of FDI, openness in trade impacts upon Ireland, which has the highest trade openness ratio in Table   10 .1. We examine how this openness affects the manufacturing sector by investigating the source of FDI and the resulting export destination patterns of both Irish-owned companies (LCs) and foreign-owned companies (MNCs).
Globalization and exporting at the national level
How do LCs within an economy fare in the globalization process? They are directly and indirectly affected by the growth of FDI, by the increase in competition on their domestic markets, and by the potential new foreign markets that the globalization process opens up.
International organizations would claim that there are very positive benefits from the presence of foreign-owned MNCs operating within the economy (see UNCTAD: 2001).
There is a growing empirical literature that examines the extent to which LCs can benefit or lose from foreign direct investment, through the linkage, spillover and crowding-out effects generated by MNCs. While some of these studies find evidence of positive effects at the sectoral level, fewer of them find evidence at the plant level, suggesting that positive effects through linkages and demonstration effects may be counterbalanced by negative crowdingout effects (see Görg and Greenaway: 2001) .
The data presented in Section 2 have shown that much of the increase in trade and FDI in Europe has involved increased Europeanization rather than globalization, that is, much In particular, we concentrate on how LCs are affected by engaging in exporting as part of the globalization process (see Sapsford: 1994, and Richardson and Rindal:1995) , leaving aside the impact that globalization may have on LCs through competition on the local market. 
Globalization and exporting at the sectoral level
When we investigate the degree of sectoral variation across manufacturing in Ireland, we find that the growth of manufacturing sector employment over the 1990s, while substantial overall, differed very widely across sectors. Table 10 .3, which shows the very large proportion of US foreign direct investment in these sectors that went to Ireland in 1998. In the context of the size of the Irish market, these shares indicate the significance of Ireland's role as an export platform in Europe for these sectors. A growing body of empirical work has documented the superior performance characteristics of exporting companies relative to non-exporters Wagner: 1997, Bernard and Jensen: 1999) 13 . In the context of Europeanization and globalization, we can speculate on the whether exporting LCs exhibit superior performance characteristics compared with non-exporting LCs and, secondly, whether LCs that are more globalized in their export patterns have superior performance characteristics to those that are more Europeanized.
To examine the nature of LCs that export compared with those whose sole export markets are European, we list the mean value of five characteristics for the two groups in Table 10 .5: Employment, Average Earnings, Gross Output, Net Output, and Net Output per Employee. In all instances the mean values for European exporters are higher than for nonexporting LCs. On average, exporting companies are larger, pay higher wages, produce more output, and are more productive than non-exporting LCs in the manufacturing sector.
Our analysis of the changing destination of Irish manufacturing exports has highlighted the Europeanization of export patterns in the Other Manufacturing sector and the globalization of exports in the Chemical and Electronic sectors. The dominance of the UK and to a lesser extent the EU generally as a traditional export destination for Irish manufactured goods suggests that LCs find it easier to export to the EU. However, the increasing importance of export destinations other than the EU may be reflected in superior performance characteristics for non-EU destination exporters, because they are forced to be more competitive and efficient in order to break into these non-traditional markets. Table   10 .5 also shows the mean characteristics for LCs that export to Non-EU countries (whether or not they export to the EU as well) between 1991-98. The mean value of each characteristic is higher for the Non-EU exporters, suggesting that, on average, global exporters employ more people, pay higher wages, produce more gross output, and are more productive than LCs that export only to the EU. In effect, the global exporters exhibit stronger performance characteristics than those companies that export only into the EU. GDP figures up to and including 1998 are from the website related to Lane and MilesiFerretti (2001) . GDP figures for 2000 are from OECD website. Source: Inflow and outflow data and GDP data up to an including 1998 are from the website related to Lane et al. (2001) . Data for 1999 and 2000 for inflows and outflows come from the IMF 2001 and data for GDP come from the OECD website. 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995- Source: Own estimates derived from the CSO Census of Local Units. 4 The particularly high openness ratios for Belgium and the Netherlands are likely to be partially explained by their hosting key entry freight ports in mainland Europe. 5 We take annual averages over five year periods (six years in the case of 1995-2000) in order to take account of the large inter-year variations in the flows. 6 The AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index ranked Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden as the most globalized countries in the world for the year end 2000. See Kearney et al. (2002) .
7 Ruane and Görg (1997) 11 Evidence on the links between MNCs and LCs is discussed in Görg and Ruane (2001) . 12 As Barry (Chapter 9 in this volume) notes, intra-industry trade across all industry subsectors in Ireland, particularly Chemicals and Machinery, has been rising since 1961. Within the Electronics sector in particular, anecdotal evidence would suggest that components trade between US-owned MNCs based in Ireland and their parent company may comprise a significant proportion of the Non-EU export data quoted. However, although exports to the USA by US-owned MNCs based in Irish manufacturing rose from 9 per cent in 1991 to 14
